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Chapter 7 
A New Global Military-Terrorism-Hegemony Social Structure 
of Accumulation for Long-Wave Upswing? 





The question addressed in this paper is the degree to which the new configuration of terrorists 
and pre-emptive strikes in the global political economy over the past decade or so is affecting 
long-term socioeconomic performance. We believe that global military-terrorist activities 
have an impact on performance through the building or otherwise of potential social 
structures of accumulation (SSAs). The key factors to consider are the impact of the current 
military-terrorism structure on levels of stability and conflict resolution. If stability and the 
resolution of conflict are at a high level this is likely to stimulate economic activity through 
higher levels of consumption, investment, trade, tourism, GDP, utility and welfare. But if the 
current forces are creating higher levels of instability and conflict in the global political 
economy then this is inhibiting the development of institutions to promote economic activity.  
The study starts with a section on the major planks of the current global military-
terrorism system. Afterwards we analyze the nature and degree of stability and conflict 
resolution in the military system. The final major section outlines some critical transmission 
mechanisms linking instability and conflict with declining performance. A conclusion 
follows. 
 
2. Major planks of the global military-terrorism system 
The current global military-terrorism system is evolving in multiple directions that are 
difficult to delineate precisely. But some fairly obvious trends and patterns are emerging that 
are becoming fairly durable and dynamic. The first plank situates the US as a powerful 
imperial force, though with much less absolute power than in the 1950s and 1960s. Militarily 
it has ‘soft’ hegemonic military dominance since while it is more powerful relatively than in 
the 1980s, its economic strength has been diminishing, which places limits on its military 
strength (Wallerstein 2002, Gulick 2004). More significantly, though, we are concerned here 
with strategy, in particular the recently amplified policy of the US ‘going it alone’ (with some 
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allies) in military and related affairs. This can be neatly schematized by calling the first plank 
the unipolar and first strike tendencies of the US imperial system.1
The second plank is the multilateralism trend. While the US is taking a unilateral 
direction, it does also at times cooperate beyond the coalition of the willing through the UN, 
NATO and nations in the Middle East and South and North America. But for the US 
multilateral or bilateral relations are really just an extension of its unilateral tendency, since it 
wants to choose whatever strategy it thinks is relevant to its “national interest”. The dominant 
states of Europe, especially France and Germany, prefer a consistently multilateral approach 
to international relations, since it correlates with the rule of law, compromise and agreements 
to solve complex problems. Such multilateral forces include the UN, NATO, the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Agreement, an expanded European Union, and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. This trend seeks to solve conflicts via institutionalized 
accords between the major parties, in the belief that this reduces instability and conflict. When 
 
 With the imperial trend the US dominates militarily and seeks to prevent other powers 
from threatening its pre-eminence. With the recent heightened focus on unilateralism, the US 
has created a military alliance with its “coalition of the willing”, including the UK, Australia, 
Japan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The doctrine of pre-emptive strike has been 
introduced by the US, to replace the old doctrine of deterrence which is argued not to be valid 
in an environment of global terrorism and rogue states. The US often seeks to go into battle 
and undertake international relations on its own terms, eschewing, for instance, many critical 
international protocols, courts, agreements, conventions and so forth (see below) while 
unilaterally attacking “terrorists” and “rogue states” in association with its coalition partners. 
It also undermines multilateral institutions by forcing its power on them, such as happened in 
several UN forums and the Chemical Weapons Convention.2  
Foreign policy in the second Bush Administration has very ideologically coherent with 
the rise to pre-eminence of the neo-conservatives and assertive nationalists. These hawks such 
as Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Zoellick, 
Stephen Hadley, Elliott Abrams and John Negroponte believe in taking an assertive position 
to prevent attacks on the US through first strikes and invasions to destroy rogue states and 
terrorists. Realists, such as Colin Powell, are now out of favour since they adhere to “old-
fashioned” notions of balance of power, international stability and predictable alliances (Kern, 
2005). It remains to be seen how the new administration in Washington affects the processes 
associated with this tendency. 
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it suits the US it too contributes to multilateral agreements, but it reserves the right to act 
unilaterally where it thinks this is in the “national interest”. 
The third plank of the system is the emergence of a relatively new form of terrorism. 
The old style terrorism of the IRA, the Red Brigade and FARC was the classic variety of 
small scale attacks and abductions in order to gain media attention and influence government. 
They tended to eschew major attacks for fear of alienating the general population. They were 
content to enhance the cause of independence and attacks on the establishment thorough 
regular incursions that kept their concerns in the public eye. The new form of terrorism 
associated with radical Islamic groups has a new agenda of attacking US hegemony in the 
Middle East, Western influence in regional areas and corrupt, pro-Western and/or relatively 
secular governments. They have announced a war that seeks major civilian casualties against 
the US and its coalition of the willing. Moreover, they seek to escalate the conflict in order to 
entice the US to overreact and reinforce their power base in the Middle East and elsewhere. In 
this fashion they champion the fundamentalist Islamic cause. 
The new form of terrorism has four main characteristics: (a) a marked expansion in the 
number of casualties per attack, (b) a majority of non-state terrorists being religious-Muslim 
in origin, (c) a growing global network of resources, and (d) a concern to destroy US 
hegemony in the Middle East. Many authors have questioned the newness of this trend, but 
these four tendencies do seem to prevail.3 The world is currently experiencing a war between 
the US and its allies and a global network of non-state terrorists that are effectively attacking 
the foundations of US dominance in the region. The war is likely to play out over several 
decades and to dominate the lives of most nations in Europe, the US, the Middle East, 
northern Africa and parts of south-east Asia and Oceania. 
The fourth plank is a series of so-called “rouge states” that also appear to be 
‘challenging’ US power. Nations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, 
Lebanon, Syria and the Sudan have variously been included, over recent years, in this 
category of states that have been trying to enhance their power through an independent 
foreign policy, acquisition of nuclear weapons and/or support for various forms of “terrorism” 
around the globe. Indeed, it was the activities of such states that ‘justified’ the US (with UN 
support) invading Afghanistan to root out the Taliban in the search for Al Qaeda terrorists, 
and also for the foray into Iraq due to supposed weapons of mass destruction and support for 
terrorists by Saddam Hussein. This is a critical part of the recent US policy of engaging in 
pre-emptive first strikes where thought necessary. Gone are the old principles of the US 
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respecting the sovereignty of established governments. They seek to be more proactive in 
encouraging changes to regimes that are obviously anti-American. 
The fifth plank of the military-terrorism system is the ‘oil regime’ and the ‘corporate 
state’. Corporations are a critical part of the system through the production of armaments, 
military hardware, trained specialists, financiers and strategists. The state also trains military 
personnel, establishes a military bureaucracy and associated intelligence and defence 
organizations. The US President is the chief of the armed forces, while Congress provides 
financial support and nationalistic fervour legitimizes the practices. Oil, however, is more 
important than some analysts have been led to believe. The Middle East would be seen like 
much of sub-Saharan Africa without oil, and no government seeking global power would 
bother to invade nations without such rich resources. Known reserves of oil are likely to 
decline by 50 percent between now and 2050, while the Middle East share is expected to 
increase from 20 percent to 45 percent over the same period (Clark, 2003). 
The sixth plank is the dominance of a neoliberalism policy framework. Starting with the 
Reagan and Thatcher revolutions, most nations of the world have reformed their governance 
structures to adhere to the free market ideology. Special reference has been given in national 
and international policy settings to moderating budget deficits, reducing the size of 
government, and protecting property rights. Fundamental to this view is the notion that the 
role of government is to provide a set of laws and institutions to protect the rights to private 
property, democracy and association. This is an important rationale for the recent unilateral 
push in the White House, since military and so-called “defence” activities are core parts of the 
“rule of law” and the “protection of private property”. The idea is that, once these public 
goods are in place, the entrepreneurial spirit can emerge free of the fetters of regulations so as 
to enhance innovation and productivity. The supply side of the economy is thus seen to be 
critical to long-term economic performance; demand in the form of investment and 
consumption will naturally flow once the basic structures are in place.4 The importance of 
neoliberalism is outlined in the core national security strategy developed by the White House 
(Bush, 2002, ch. VI). 
The seventh plank of the global military-terrorism system is increasing dominance of 
the ‘American way of life’ through most nations and regions. American culture, economy and 
polity are being adopted through the four corners of the globe. However, this does not 
necessarily translate into absolute American hegemony or even the uniformity of culture. But 
it does provide a pattern to the processes affecting the global system. It may lead to the 
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creation of alternative sources of power, and to the emergence of new cultural forms. Critical 
to this is a parliamentary system of checks and balances, regular elections, and a sophisticated 
corporate media/news apparatus. The neoconservatives seek to stimulate and if necessary 
force on rouge states a world in the image of the US, with free markets, parliamentary 
democracy and an open society. As the revised US national security strategy says, it is critical 
to “expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of 
democracy” (Bush, 2002, p. 21). 
 
3. Contradictions of the global military-terrorism system 
Emanating from these seven planks of the global military system are several contradictions, 
amplifying factors and enabling processes. Contradictions of the global military system are 
those tendencies that simultaneously promote positive and negative elements, and which are 
potentially destabilizing to the system. Through time the negative elements will tend to 
prevail unless major changes are made to promote stability, conflict resolution and 
performance. Contradictions are those paradoxes, ironies and oppositions that lead to 
endogenous instabilities and conflicts if not suitably checked by institutional constraints, 
accords and agreements. Every institutional apparatus has imbedded contradictions, but they 
will only become manifest when the vested interests take control in their narrow self-interest; 
when instrumental efficiency is not a critical part of the dynamic of the system; where 
financial and military activities dominate over productive relations and processes; and when 
instability and conflict arise from unstable power and authority structures (O’Hara 2005). The 
core contradiction, other contradictory processes, amplifying factors and relationships of 
interdependency are illustrated in Figure 1, below: 
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Figure 1: Contradictions, Amplifications & Circuit Affecting Instability & Conflict 
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Terrorism and the wars associated with it are complex phenomena, and therefore it is 
necessary to situate it in a combined social, political and economic environment. Figure 1 
illustrates the interdependency between 9 factors. Usually there is the core contradiction and a 
number of secondary contradictions. The core contradiction lies in the relationship between 
the creation of a power vacuum from the global military imbalance of the demise of the 
Soviet system, and the tendency of the US to impose forms of relative hegemonic dominance 
in the Middle East. The other contradiction important in this context is that between the 
generation of global neoliberalism and the associated tendency towards uneven development. 
Also critical are certain amplifying factors that produce a divergence between the direct costs 
of terrorism and war (deaths, injuries, destruction of property, etc) and the much wider 
generation of fear and intimidation among the population (which affects utility, satisfaction, 
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quality of life, apparent security, the social and business climate and so forth). It is necessary 
to see all these factors in dynamic linkage and realistic practice. 
The Core Contradiction vis-à-vis the ‘military-terrorism SSA’ relates to the interface 
between the military vacuum posed by the demise of the USSR and the rise of US relative 
hegemony in the Middle East. The current global military system is in metamorphosis from 
the old cold war system to a new one the nature of which is somewhat indeterminate. Cold 
war stability rested on the superpowers knowing that both sides had the ability to destroy their 
enemies through “mutually assured destruction”. It was unlikely that one of the superpowers 
could strike first without the prospect of retaliation. Various agreements and consultations 
were reached among the major powers for controls on armaments, nuclear weapons and long 
range missiles which prevented an escalation into full scale war, even (eventually) during the 
Cuban missile crisis of 1962. While during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s absolute US 
hegemony ruled much of the world, on the military side a ‘relative balance’ existed that 
prevented major war. 
With the demise of the Soviet Union around 1990, such an institutional balance was 
upset, and a military power vacuum was generated into which various groups and nations 
quickly moved. Indeed, the very process of destroying the power of the USSR in Afghanistan 
created the potential for radical Islamic groups to move into this vacuum, since they were 
supported heavily by the US and its allies. Afghanistan was a theatre within which Al Qaeda 
developed critical skills, networks and knowledge through which their power could multiply. 
Saddam Hussein also was supported by the US and its allies, and Iraq’s foray into Kuwait 
(which led to the first Gulf War) was a result of a desire to expand its power in the post-
Soviet vacuum. The terrorist activities of Al Qaeda and associates through the 1990s and 
2000s gradually grew, culminating in the “event that changed the world”: 9/11. This could 
never have happened without the demise of the Soviet Union which created instability in the 
global military system. As Bob Riggs (2003, p. 4) says: 
When bin Laden changed the face of contemporary warfare by launching well-
planned attacks on symbolic civilian targets, he wrote a new chapter in modern 
military history. … Bin Laden … show[ed] that the strategic and effective use of 
violence against symbolic civilian targets makes it possible for small, well-organised 
and ruthless terror groups to destabilise the most seemingly all-powerful of 
governments, and even the stability of the world order. 
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This transition process to a new military-terrorism configuration is enhancing instability as 
the US deepens its imperial role and neoconservative bent while radical Islamic elements seek 
to be included in the emerging power system. Out of the power vacuum created from the 
demise of the USSR Islamic radicals are seeking to be taken seriously as military and cultural 
elements of a new world system. The battle between the imperial and neoconservative forces 
and the Islamic elements are currently being played out in numerous theatres in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Palestine/Israel and numerous other areas of the world. 
The US alliance is sharing an unstable power system with Islamic radicals, and the battle is 
likely to continue until some degree of sharing of power is undertaken in global and regional 
decision-making. Until then battles will be fought, resistance against the US and its allies will 
continue, and military-security instability will continue. 
The instability created by the power vacuum will play out over many years to come 
until a dynamic relative balance of power is (possibly) generated. In the meantime, military 
conflicts will continue, and likely become worse before they moderate. What we are currently 
seeing is a historic shift towards the re-emergence of Islamic power in global politics, while 
absolute US economic power declines, European potential rises and China and its archipelago 
emerges as a dominant player. US relative hegemony in the Middle East, in particular, is 
currently in question through conventional and terrorist battles in Iraq, Israel/Palestine, 
Europe, Northern Africa, and elsewhere. The problems of so-called terrorism and the war on 
terrorism are thus likely to get worse until Islamic interests are able to impinge on the world 
system. The recent terrorist suicide attacks in New York, Bali, Morocco, Spain, London, Iraq 
and elsewhere are likely to be the mere start of a long campaign of re-establishing Islamic 
interests.  
The current multilateral-unilateral system is generating instability from both sides. On 
the multilateral side, for instance, the United Nations has been in crisis mode for a number of 
years, as the US seeks to challenge its legitimacy; it was inadequate in the face of the Kosova 
crisis of the late 1990s; and was reluctant to strongly support the invasion of Iraq in the face 
of lack of evidence of weapons of mass destruction and Iraqi support for major terrorists. The 
multilateral foundation of the UN is constantly being threatened by the US as it moves in a 
unilateral direction, along with members of the “coalition of the willing”. This lack of UN 
unity is increasing instability in international relations. Multilateral ineffectiveness is 
stimulating US unilateralism, while unilateralism is contributing to the ineffectiveness of 
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multilateralism. This crisis of collective security is leading to greater conflict and war in the 
global system. As one analyst says: 
A world in which the paramount international security institution is unable to solve or 
even effectively address the most dramatic and dangerous threats to security is a world 
on the verge of regressing to a system of self-help. Neither bashing multilateralism nor 
singing its praises will resolve anything. Rather policymakers must acknowledge that 
multilateralism entails benefits as well as problems, and that it is necessary to develop 
the political will and determination to subject multilateralism to thorough review and, if 
the need arises, radical reforms. Only then can we bring about the kind of international 
order that both sides of the Atlantic as well as the greater international system so desire 
(Krause, 2004, p. 57). 
On the other hand, the unilateral trend of the US and the dominance of the neo-conservative-
cum-nationalist wings of the Republican Party have enhanced instability. They have led an 
invasion of a country that was previously stable, to one that is now a theatre and global 
stimulus for growing networks of Islamic militants. The US invaded Iraq with insufficient 
ground troops, inadequate border control, lack of appreciation of the problems of governance, 
and inadequate recognition of the potential for heightened instability. Bin Laden and the Al 
Qaeda network undertook 9/11 to provoke US retaliation in the hope of creating a theatre 
where radical Islamic networks could flourish. This is exactly what the Iraqi war did – 
increase instability, promote effective resistance to the US and its allies, and increase conflict 
not only regionally but throughout much of the world.  
The Hawks in Washington argue that increasing short-term instability will in the 
intermediate-to-long-run reduce conflict. They say that pre-empting terrorists and rogue states 
may create some degree of regional instability – such as in the Middle East and the Korean 
Peninsula – but that this is the short-term price of long term stability and resolution of 
conflict. However, this ignores critical counter-arguments such as the following problems 
suggested by Ikenberry (2002). While the US creates a core principle of the first strike, this 
may engender other states to put it into practice. Pakistan, Russia, China, North Korea and so 
on may decide that they need no firm evidence of attacks to strike first and destroy the enemy. 
It may also encourage states to accelerate their programs of weapons of mass destruction to 
deter the US. First-strikes and invasions before evidence is available will likely increase the 
number of wars, and increase the resources necessary for state building and peace-keeping for 
perhaps decades into the future. These wars and state building programs increase the degree 
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of uncertainty regarding the future course of invaded states. It is likely to increase the number 
of invaded and changed regimes, but the future course of events may evolve in an 
unanticipated fashion, creating imperial overreach where the US requires long-term resources 
from others but has already alienated potential coalition partners. 
The unilateral trend requires multilateral cooperation in intelligence, logistics, legality 
and socioeconomic policy. But potential partners are less likely to cooperate after being 
passed over in favour of more compliant junior partners such as Australia. Acting imperially 
in security and military matters is unlikely to generate cooperation in other areas such as trade 
liberalization, financial stability and organized crime. The US imperial trend may accelerate 
the demise of US power by creating an international backlash against the US. Numerous other 
states may rebel against the imperial US order. US military dominance and war-mongering 
may incite rebellion by other states, even those previously sympathetic to US power.  
What is the link between this heightened global instability and conflict? For the first 
time in recent centuries a major attack has been unleashed on the mainland of the relatively 
most powerful nation in the world. This is an unprecedented attack on US power: the most 
significant challenge to a dominant nation since the demise of British power in the late 1800s. 
Radical Islamic militants are developing global networks against a major power, which is 
manifesting in a series of mostly suicide attacks against the US and its “coalition of the 
willing”. The terrorist statistics compiled by the US Department of State and others are useful 
because they enable us to assess the degree of military action against the US, since their 
definition of terrorism ignores US-backed (or generated) terrorist activities. 
Using these statistics we generate an “Index of Anti-US Terrorism” (IAUST) for the 
period 1990-2006, divided into two periods: 1990-1997 and 1998-2006. For each major attack 
against US interests an impact figure of between 0 and 10 points is given, depending on the 
severity of the attack. A summation of the Index is shown in Table 1, below. Using this 
IAUST Index we found that non-state terrorist attacks in the past 9 years (1998-2006; Table 
1b) have been much more proactive against the US “alliance” than in the 7 years before then 
(1990-1997; Table 1a). There was thus an increase in conflict associated with this expansion 




Table 1a: Index of Anti-US Terrorism (IAUST), 1990-1997: 
6 most critical non-state terrorist attacks against the ‘US alliance’ 
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Table 1b: Index of Anti-US Terrorism (IAUST), 1998-2006: 
7 most critical non-state terrorist attacks against ‘US alliance’ & its ‘protectorates’ 
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42/70 = 60% 
Source: Adapted from NCC (2005); US Department of State (1992-2004); Fratianni & Kang (2004); 
Burnham et al (2007); Kalpakian (2005); NCC (2005).  
 
These figures show that before the radical Islamists became organized there were far fewer 
challenges to US power, in the Middle East in particular. The six most critical attacks against 
US strategic interests during 1990-1997 – in Turkey (1991), Columbia (1992), New York 
City (1993), Egypt (1994), Saudi Arabia (1995) and New York City (1997) – were 
collectively fairly minor incursions into the US power base, although the New York City ones 
were symbolically important as an attack on the mainland with 7 civilians killed. The 
strategic, economic and social impacts of the attacks were minor, with an overall “impact 
score” of 16/60 or 27 percent. During the early-mid 1990s many of the so-called international 
terrorist attacks (as defined by the State Department) were by secular groups, such as FARC 
in Columbia which was protecting agricultural communities against terrorist actions by US-
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supported military and paramilitary forces.5 Small-scale terrorist actions for diplomatic and/or 
media attention seem to have been the norm among FARC and related groups. 
It took the radical Islamic groups a decade or so to institute sufficient networks against 
US power to pose a formidable threat after the demise of the US-USSR relative military 
balance of power. Once they organized themselves and learnt the techniques of large-scale 
suicide missions, by the late 1990s successes were forthcoming. They had bases such as in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan with which to organize campaigns, and during the early 2000s the 
majority of international terrorist groups were religious (mainly radical Islamic) in nature, as 
shown by Table 2, below (see Schmidt, 2004):6 
 
Table 2: Terrorist Groups Primarily Religious/Non-religious in Focus, 
1968-2002 
 1968 1980 1992 1995 2002       
Number Religious* 0 2 11 25 38 
Number Non-Religious* 11 62 37 33 36       
Percent Religious* 0 3 23 43 51 
Percent Non-Religious* 100 97 77 57 49       
Percent Fatalities by Religious Terrorists** n.a. n.a. n.a. 58% n.a. 
 
Source: Adapted from Hoffman* (1997, pp. 48, 52); US State Department** (2003, pp. 99,125). 
 
“Religious” terrorist groups as a percent of all terrorist groups (defined by the US State 
Department) rose from 0 (1969) to 3 (1980) to 23 (1992) to 43 (1995) to 51 (2002); becoming 
the majority by 2002, while their contribution to total terrorist fatalities had already well 
exceeded 50 percent by 1995. 
This was, by-and-large, a new form of terrorism more intent on major attacks against 
US hegemony in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. The late 1990s and 2000s thus 
saw an escalation in significant attacks, with the suicide bombings of US Embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania (1998) leading the charge with 301 civilian deaths and 5,077 injured. This was 
followed by the most significant attack on the US homeland ever, the 9/11 suicide plane 
crashes in New York City and Washington DC (2001), killing around 3000 civilians.  
The 9/11 attacks stimulated a whole series of network plans throughout the Middle East, 
Asia, Europe, and North Africa as radical Islamists gained confidence in their cause. Hence 
the suicide bombs set off in Bali (2002), which killed 180 civilians; similar attacks in 
Casablanca (2003, a haven for especially British tourists), killing 30; the 10 suicide train 
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bombs in Madrid (2004), killing 191 and responsible for the defeat of the government in the 
elections; and the main suicide attacks on the train and bus networks in London (2005), 
killing about 65 civilians. Al Qaeda along with its informal global networks and the US and 
its allies have declared war on each other. The ongoing Afghan war after 9/11 ironically 
helped Al Qaeda by forcing them to become non-state combatants with no territory and 
increasing network power throughout the world. Having no state to protect and amorphous 
networks enhanced their cause, and make it difficult for the US to retaliate against them.  
Wanting the US to retaliate and spread their imperial power through the Middle East 
even more forcefully helped Al Qaeda and their allies immensely. Iraq then became a major 
theatre for Islamic militants to engage in serious war against the US, gaining critical 
experience and honing the craft of suicide bombings and Guerrilla Warfare. The 2003 US 
invasion of Iraq was a serious mistake and illustrates the contradictory limits of neo-
conservatism. According to the only scientific estimate of total Iraqi casualties during the 
Iraqi war (aggregate figures for the period March 2003 to June 2006) (Burnham et al 2007; an 
update of Roberts 2004), since the US invasion, an estimated 601,027 Iraqis were killed by 
violent methods. This was a social survey of Iraqi households, undertaken between 20 May 
and 10 July 2006, backup up in over 90 percent of cases by a death certificate; with the results 
published in the Lancet. Of the 601,027 Iraqi deaths by violent means, 24 percent were killed 
by “Other” groups such as Al Qaeda and their allies in association with religious-ethnic 
reprisals (141,241 people); 31 percent were killed by the “Coalition of the Willing” (188,422 
people); and 45% were killed by “Unknown” personnel (271,364 people; likely a combination 
of Al Qaeda inspired groups, religious-ethnic reprisals and Coalition members). Thus, the 
number killed by Al Qaeda in association with other Islamic groups, 141,241, can be seen as a 
very likely under-estimate of the amount of anti-US terrorism (including terrorism which 
questions the presence of the Coalition in Iraq) during the first 40 months of the Iraq War. 
The number of total Iraqis violently killed by all groups increased from 90,154 (2003-04) to 
180,308 (2004-05) and 330,565 (2005-06), with the total killed by “Other” groups, including 
Al Qaeda and other Islamists, increasing over the same period from 8,114 to 34,259 and 
99,169 people. These Iraqi’s killed, especially by Al Qaeda et al can be seen as a major threat 
to the US invasion and their broader imperial pursuits; hence the impact, “10”, is very likely 
broadly equal to the 9/11 attacks in terms of morale and geo-political significance. 
Hence, 9/11 and the Iraq War were the most critical events promoting radical Islamic 
strategy against US power. Therefore, overall, the “impact score” for the 1998-2006 attacks 
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against the US is 42/70 or 60 percent. This is a more than double the strategic importance of 
the attacks earlier, in the 1990s. 
Greater conflict has thus emanated from instability associated with the failures of 
multilateral–unilateral security; the vacuum created by the scrapping of the US-USSR balance 
of power system; and (declining) “US hegemony” in the Middle East. An amorphous World 
War now exists between the forces of US power (including its allies) and radical Islamic 
religious-military groups. At present this war has no balance of power institutions to moderate 
the conflict, and therefore is likely to escalate into the future. In doing so, it will likely lead to 
more loss of life, declining utility and diminished socioeconomic performance for many 
nations. The link between instability, conflict and declining performance is analyzed in more 
detail in the next section. 
 
4. Instability, conflict and performance 
The major hypothesis of this study is that the emergence of a military-terrorism SSA 
depends upon positive levels of stability, conflict resolution and performance. The 
relationship between these factors is illustrated in Figure 2, below: 






        Institutional                          Conflict                         Socioeconomic 




The central hypothesis isolates the importance of linkages between levels of stability in 
military-terrorism institutions, conflict resolution, and socioeconomic performance. Instability 
within and between these institutions stimulates high levels of conflict and war, contributing 
to anomalous performance. In the previous section we showed how instability within and 
between the unilateral and multilateral relationship is promoting conflict, war and terrorism in 
the global system. This section presents evidence that such instability and conflict is 
inhibiting socioeconomic performance, and thus preventing the formation of a military-
terrorism SSA to stimulate long wave upswing in the global political economy. 
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We now come to Contradiction 2 (see Figure 1, above) concerning the spread of global 
neoliberalism and the process of uneven growth and development. A major problem is the 
inability of US neoliberal policy hegemony in the Middle East to improve the performance of 
Arab nations. US influence in the area and the work of US-inspired IMF-World Bank 
institutions heavily influenced Arab nations to globalize and deregulate. Arab nations were 
told that if they opened their economies to international capital, privatized government 
enterprises and deregulated labour markets this would lead to improved performance. There 
are two problems here. The first is that many Middle Eastern nations did open up to markets, 
but such action did not materially improve their standard of living, as shown from the work of 
Peter Nunnemkamp (2004).  
The evidence is fairly clear that, through time, living in an environment in which 
economic performance is sub-standard, political repression is strong and there are significant 
numbers of sympathetic educated people, provides a perfect breeding ground for radical 
Islamic networks. This has been the environment of most Arab nations in the Middle East. 
(Testas 2004.) Educated radicals are in high demand for their skills in areas such as 
information and communications technology and the ability to fit into a foreign environment. 
Also they are more likely to be interested in political activity and be committed to the cause. 
The political environment in most Arab nations is also conducive to terrorism as many 
national governments are affiliated with the US and provide few forums for radicals to be 
included in decision-making. Lastly, deteriorating performance provides an incentive for 
radical change to improve the conditions of Islamic people, even if Islam requires a balance of 
economic and social considerations. Internal tensions and conflict exacerbate these problems. 
It is in this complex environment that radical Islamic networks have developed. US 
relative hegemony in the Middle East has stimulated a host of corrupt and repressive regimes, 
such as in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt; the promises of neoliberalism failed to 
materialize vis-à-vis socioeconomic performance; and therefore many educated (and other) 
people have flocked to the message of the Wahabism Brotherhood and their modern followers 
such as Al Qaeda, Al-Salafiya, Ansa Al Qaeda Brigades and Jemaah Islamiya (Katzman, 
2005). 
The “New Terrorism” associated with radical Islamic networks is bent on greater 
fatalities in their war against relative US hegemony (along with its allies) in the Middle East 
and elsewhere. The Hawks in the Bush Administration are similarly bent on unilateral 
intervention in the region through violent regime change and wars. This has increased conflict 
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in the Middle East and elsewhere. There have been attacks on civilians from both sides, 
whether as direct targets or the unconcerned effects of war. The costs of such terrorism and 
war are multiple, with transmission mechanisms negatively affecting performance in all 
directions. Some of the transmission mechanisms are illustrated in Table 3, below (see Frey et 
al, 2004a), although these examples are heterogeneous and do not concentrate purely on the 
“new” terrorism. 
 
Table 3: Impact of Terrorism on Socioeconomic Performance 
Variable/ 
Author 
Region  Period Cost Problem 
Consumption  
(Eckstein et al, 2004) 
Israel 1950-2003 C ↓ 5% per annum Drop in Demand 
Investment  
(Fielding, 2003)  
Israel 1988-1998 Ic↓ 28% 
Im↓ 15% 
Drop in Demand 
International Trade  
(Nitsch et al, 2004) 
Numerous 1968-1979 Doubling Terrorism  
↓ Bilateral Trade 4% 
Lower Trade 
FDI 





12-14% ↓ FDI Declining 
Investment 
Tourism 
(Enders et al, 1992) 
Europe 1974-1988 $16.145b Lower Growth 
Tourism 
(Drakos et al, 2003) 
Meditterannean 
 




Airline Tickets  
(Ito & Lee, 2004) 
USA, 9/11 2001-2003 10% ↓ in Yield Corporate 
Bankruptcy 
GDP per Capita  
(Eckstein et al, 2004) 
Israel 1950-2003 “High” Terrorism ↓ 
GDP by 3.5% pa 
Declining 
Performance 
Terrorism Risk Factor 
(Viscusi et al, 2003) 
Experimental 
Methods 
2002 Willing to Pay 70% ↑ 




[Frey et al 2004b] 
Northern Ireland 2003 Willing to Forgo 41% 





These studies show that terrorism and the wars and conflicts caught up with it affect every 
major aspect of the economy. The most important components of private sector demand, 
consumption and investment, are significantly affected. Consumption expenditure can be 
affected through adversely impacting consumer confidence as people become fearful, 
reducing their geographical mobility and desire to visit certain shopping centres. Investment 
spending is usually impacted as a drop in business confidence increases uncertainty and 
expectations of profit decline. Critical aspects of the international economy, such as trade, 
FDI, tourism and airlines are impacted. Imports tend to decline as domestic demand suffers, 
while exports decline as the quality of products and innovation deteriorate. FDI falls off as 
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domestic corporations perform below par and the overseas businesses are less inclined to 
operate in areas impacted by terrorism. Tourism and commercial airlines suffer as people go 
to places with more safety and protection, or develop alternative consumption patterns. 
Contagion affects vast areas as nations not attacked yet linked to nations that are 
attacked are affected. This is an important amplifying affect associated with people’s 
tendency to implicate whole areas that seem on the surface to be relatively homogenous. High 
levels of terrorism adversely affect GDP levels as consumption, investment, trade, FDI and 
tourism declines have negative impacts on the multiplier and accelerator. But broader 
measures of performance such as utility and life satisfaction seem to be more heavily 
impacted than the narrower variables. So affected by higher apparent levels of personal risk 
are people in the terrorism-affected areas that they are willing to pay very high prices for 
plane tickets, for instance, if terrorism would decline to zero. This is said to reflect their 
diminished levels of utility. And lastly, life satisfaction has been demonstrated to decline to 
create a ‘peace premium’ where the affected population are prepared to forgo very large 
levels of income for terrorism to decline to low levels when it has become part of everyday 
life. 
Overall, the aggregate costs of much higher than average levels of terrorism and war 
characteristic of the new form of terrorism are likely to be vast for those regions where radical 
Islamic networks and/or coalitions of the willing are active. This is true despite the fact that 
terrorism often has very limited direct affects. Much of the cost of terrorism is due to the fear 
and intimidation imposed on the civilian population, through social-psychological linkages to 
military force, technology, the media and opportunistic governments. As O’Hara (2004) and 
Mueller (2005) point out, relatively speaking very few people die of terrorist attacks 
compared with homicides, suicides, tuberculosis and heart attacks. Yet the social-




This paper has sought to analyze whether a new global military-terrorism social structure of 
accumulation (SSA) has emerged to contribute to long wave upswing in the early years of the 
new millennium. We found that the most important thing for the construction of a SSA is a 
series of institutions that promote global stability and conflict resolution, which contribute to 
socioeconomic performance. We delineated the main features of the current evolving 
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military-strategic system. These included the imperial trend of US unilateralism, 
multilateralism, a new form of terrorism, a series of “rouge states”, the oil regime with the 
corporate-industrial state, neoliberalism, and the increasing dominance of the US way of life. 
This structure of institutions was found to be promoting greater levels of instability and 
conflict, since the dual system of unilateralism-multilateralism is in disarray, new forms of 
terrorism linked to US unilateralism are heightening wars and disputes, the oil regime is 
contributing to conflict and corruption, while neoliberalism and the US way of life are 
creating a wave of insurgency against the “infidels”. A major problem is the power vacuum 
since the demise of the Eastern Block and the emergence of even more conflicting groups 
such as the radical Islamic networks and the neo-conservatives in Washington. 
Then we turned to the question of socioeconomic performance and found that the 
current structure of institutions is enhancing terrorism and war in the global system. 
Neoliberal reforms in the Arab world have failed to contribute to performance and hence 
stimulated the anger of Islamic radicals who abhor US institutions that fail to advance the 
cause of Muslims. Greater levels of terrorism associated with the new system is reducing 
private consumption and investment demand; adversely impacting FDI, tourism and trade; 
and reducing GDP growth, utility and life satisfaction. Greater levels of instability and 
conflict in the global system will likely continue reducing performance in critical areas. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that a new military-terrorism social structure of accumulation is 
emerging to enhance long wave upswing in the global political economy. 
 
Notes
                                                 
1 While there are of course unilateral and multilateral trends in the current system, Frank Harvey is correct when 
he says that: “there are no purely unilateral or multilateral strategies or policies; every major foreign policy 
initiative falls somewhere on a continuum (and often includes components of many strategies coexisting 
simultaneously). There are “principled” and “instrumental” forms of unilateralism, bilateralism and 
multilateralism, and these foreign policy options are often applied concurrently and strategically by all states at 
different points in time, occasionally within the same crisis” (Harvey 2003-04, p. 24). 
2 Bob Rigg (2003) argues that the US underlined the Chemical Weapons Convention through demanding that the 
independently minded re-election of Director-General, Jose Bustani, be withdrawn; and ensuring that Iraq was 
prevented from joining the Convention. The US also encouraged Israel to expand their stock of weapons of mass 
destruction, despite the double standard that this perpetuated; and it is not bound by its earlier undertaking to 
refrain from using nuclear weapons against states that do not have them. 
3 For instance, Isabelle Duyvesteyn (2004) critically analyses the notion of the “new terrorism” and argues 
against it. Her critique is based on “new terrorists” (a) acting transnationally”, (b) being religious fanatics”, (c) 
attacking as many people as possible, and (d) indiscriminate targeting of victims. She negates every one of these 
points, although not much is argued on the fourth point. The four parts of the “new Terrorism” `criteria used in 
this paper, shown in the text of this article, are mostly different to her list, She ignores the tendencies, global 
networks (not simply “transnational”) and anti-“US Hegemony” aspects of the new terrorism. Many authors 
accept this change towards “new Terrorism”, including, for instance, one of the first to argue this (Bruce 
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Hoffman, 1997) and, more recently, Michael Kometer (2004), who says that “The real difference is that for the 
militant Islamic movement, the strategy is a coherent one, where all four operational areas – motivation, 
organization, support, and operations – are congruent because they point to the same mechanism: global 
insurgency that gradually builds strength for a final takeover of the world. This is the nature of the war on which 
we are embarked” (p. 74). While I agree with this in large measure, I disagree with the “final takeover of the 
world” remark as an exaggeration. 
4 A related part of neoliberalism is the increasingly global economy, expanding the free movement of money 
capital, plus goods and services. National economies are becoming more global in the sense that they are 
increasing their dependency on the world market, capital is becoming more mobile, and corporations can move 
transnationally with few barriers to entry and exit. Through the WTO attempts are being made to limit tariffs on 
the movement of goods and services, minimize subsidies to exporters and domestic producers, and expand 
intellectual property rights. Through the workings of the IMF developing and emerging nations have been 
encouraged to reform state finances and open up capital markets to global competition. The World Bank has 
been encouraging underdeveloped nations to restructure their economies to promote markets to foster 
technological innovation and industrial development. (see O’Hara, 2006). 
5 FARC refers to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, and has contributed a “significant” (usually 
isolated) number of the so-called terrorist attacks listed in the US State Department statistics. FARC supported 
and often represented the rural peasants who prefer to have land ownership and collective structures of 
association rather than the government creating large land ownership structures with the dispossessed moving to 
the cities as wage labor. By the late 1990s, FRAC controlled 60 percent of the country, including the provision 
of schools, decentralised judicial structures, and hospital services (Brittain, 2005, p. 23). Many peasants migrated 
to the FARC areas. There has been a history of US support for the central government, including recently with 
“an attack on rural areas where local peasant farmers support … FARC” (former US General James Hill), “not 
against the guerrilla army itself” (Brittain, 2005, p. 28). In response, FARC has “been moving away from small 
scale operations and into large-scale, continuous, direct confrontations implemented through well-orchestrated, 
simultaneous attacks on state forces in many parts of the country” (Brittain, 2005, p. 31). 
6 These statistics define religious as “primarily religious”, and therefore do not include terrorist groups that are 
primarily nationalist or fighting for independence for their homeland unless the religious element is the core 
aspect of the nationalism. The IRA, for instance, according to these figures, is primarily nationalist in orientation 
(rather than religious). If groups such as this were defined as religious then the statistics and argument would 
have to be re-analysed. 
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